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‘Martin Heidegger’s Path to an Aesthetic Ethoj’ 
Angus Brook 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Martin Heidegger is infamous for his rejection of the validity of Ethics as a 
philosophical endeavour and moreover, for his aesthetic formulation of ethoj. In this 
paper I will attempt to trace the path of Heidegger’s thought from his early 
engagement with Aristotle and Religion, through pre-Socratic thinking, to the 
formulation of ethoj as an authentic dwelling in the truth of being revealed by the 
poet. 
 
There are, at the outset, two introductory themes to discuss. First, there is the issue of 
Heidegger’s rejection of ethics, and second; the formulation of an aesthetic ethoj. 
 
In the ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger provides an argument for the rejection of 
ethics as a valid philosophical endeavour. The context, then, for the rejection of ethics 
is grounded on a discussion of humanism and further, an argument which determines 
humanism and ethics as intrinsically linked.  
 
Heidegger determines the essence of humanism to be no more or less than a kind of 
metaphysical thinking: for humanism is either grounded on metaphysics or is the 
ground of metaphysics1. The question of ethics, as such, arises in this text as a kind of 
thinking intrinsically linked to both humanism and metaphysics. The question of 
ethics is provoked by humanism and is also linked to metaphysics as a product of the 
development of metaphysics in a historical sense2. So, the rejection of the validity of 
ethics is posited by Heidegger, in the first instance, insofar as he rejects metaphysics. 
Thus, the destruction of metaphysics as onto-theology is crucial to appreciating why 
Heidegger rejects ethics. 
 
In this ‘letter on humanism’ Heidegger also provides a second, positive, form of the 
rejection of ethics. Here, Heidegger reflects on the question: “when are you going to 
write an ethics?”3 to which he replies: “If ethics signifies a thinking about the ethoj 
of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the 
primordial ground of being-human (as Dasein) is in itself originary ethics. However, 
this thinking is not ethics… because it is ontology”4.  
 
Heidegger then poses his formulated question of ethoj: If this thinking that ponders 
the truth of being determines the essence of being-Dasein… as belonging to being… 
then, what can this thinking disclose in relation to directives for actual living?5 
 
The answer Heidegger gives is this: thinking builds upon the house of being, or 
language6, in such a way that the destined (historical) unfolding of being enjoins 
being-Dasein in each case to dwell in the truth of being.7 In other words, a 
Heideggerian ethics (if you will) is the argument we ought to become truly human. 
This ‘ought’ of being operates within the three primary dimensions of the truth of 
being: language, thinking and history.  
 
This formulation of ethoj is further developed in Heidegger’s work, Holderlin’s 
Hymn “The Ister”. Here, Heidegger provides both a determination of authentic ethoj 
and an argument of just how this authentic ethoj becomes possible for humans. In the 
first instance, an authentic ethoj is determined as: that potentiality for being in which 
the being of humans is fulfilled: being homely in becoming unhomely8. An authentic 
ethoj, as such, is no more or less than a becoming homely (a becoming truly human) 
wherein being-human is determined as the unhomely – the uncanny, the unheimlich, 
the d a i m on ej. This authentic ethoj is both grounded upon and revealed by the poet as 
demigod, for being can be said only as the poetic m u thoj or as l og oj9. 
 
Two questions remain to be asked: 
• Why does Heidegger reject ethics? 
• How does Heidegger reach this aesthetic formulation of ethoj in which it is 
poetry as m u thoj and l og oj that grounds an authentic life? 
 
I will attempt to address both questions through the following overview of 
Heidegger’s path to an Aesthetic ethoj 
 
2. The Question of Grounding phenomenology in Heidegger’s early thinking: 
Martin Heidegger’s early attempts to ground phenomenology were marked by two 
pivotal themes; the interpretation of Aristotle and Religion. Heidegger sought through 
Aristotle to ground phenomenology as ontology – attempting a recovery of an 
authentic way into the question of being. This quest for ground forms the basis for the 
deconstruction of metaphysics and the resultant rejection of religion. Moreover, this 
quest reveals the way in which Heidegger will constitute ethos as a problem for 
philosophy.  
 
One of Heidegger’s earliest texts, ‘Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to 
Aristotle’, highlights the problem of grounding phenomenology as ontology. Here, 
Heidegger posits three intertwined characteristics of ground: historical ground, proper 
ground and authenticity as ground.  
 
In the first case, the problem of grounding lies within the horizon of philosophy as a 
historical phenomenon. The ground of philosophy, as such, belongs to the historical 
origin of philosophy of which – Heidegger argues – Aristotle represents the fulfilment 
and endpoint.10 The first character of grounding, then, is marked by a return or 
retrieval of the historical origin. 
 
The second characteristic of ground operates as the problem of determining the proper 
matter of thought of philosophy. For Heidegger, the ground of philosophy in this 
sense is being-human as Dasein – the way of being-human that is philosophical. As 
such, the problem of grounding philosophy is that of disclosing and characterising the 
way of being-human that constitutes being-understanding or thinking-being.11   
 
The third characteristic of ground, then, revolves around what Heidegger calls the 
tendency of Dasein to fall away from oneself, or, the intrinsic inauthenticity of 
everyday human concern.12 The problem of grounding philosophy in this sense is that 
of disclosing the authenticity of Dasein – of what or how it is to be truly human – that 
founds philosophy as an authentic way of existence.13 
 
 
The way of grounding philosophy is thus threefold. The ground is first and foremost 
historical and etymological – the ground is Greek as the primordial origin of 
philosophy as a way of being. Moreover, the ground of philosophy is the being of 
Dasein insofar as philosophy expresses and is motivated by what it is to exist as 
Dasein. Further, if philosophy is to attain validity – if philosophy is to reveal the truth 
of being – then, philosophy must be grounded on authenticity – the truth of being 
Dasein. 
 
This problem of grounding then forms the basic problems of phenomenology – for 
phenomenology as ontology must address the problem of being and ground – of 
uncovering the truth of being and of disclosing the being of Dasein as the ground of 
philosophy.14 Further, phenomenology must find its way into this problem of ground 
through the history of philosophy and in opposition to the way in which philosophy 
has fallen away from its own authentic ground. As such, phenomenology becomes a 
way of de-construction – a way of seeking being-the-ground in various senses that 
inherently involves a destruction of inauthentic or improper grounding and the 
construction or disclosure of the authenticity that makes philosophy possible.15  
 
3. With Respect to Aristotle: The De-Construction of Metaphysics as onto-
theology 
For Heidegger, Aristotle represents both the culmination of Greek philosophy and the 
origin of the ‘Greek-Christian’ tradition of metaphysics. As such, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle is de-constructive – an interpretation that destroys the 
inauthenticity of the tradition of metaphysics and thus also allows the possibility of 
recovering the authentic ground of Greek thinking. This deconstructive relation with 
Aristotle is then, the point of origin for Heidegger’s attempts to ground 
phenomenology, and moreover, the point of origin for the question of being.  The 
primary task of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle is thus the destruction of 
improper ways of grounding philosophy – a clearing the way towards the truth of 
being as ground. 
 
At the same time, this deconstructive process with respect to Aristotle forms the basis 
for Heidegger’s rejection of Ethics. Herein, there are three primary themes that I 
would like to draw out as illustrations of the interrelatedness of this deconstructive 
grounding and the rejection of ethics. 
 
A. The Primacy of Ontology 
The first theme of Heidegger’s relation to Aristotle is that of ontology. Here, ontology 
is determined as the ground of philosophy as proper. In other words, ontology is the 
only proper matter of thought and the only proper way of being-philosophical. Thus, 
in the 1921 to 1922 lectures on Aristotle, Heidegger poses the proper of philosophy as 
ontology: the question of the ground of beings, the sense of being, and as an authentic 
way of being Dasein.16 The essence of philosophy proper is therefore ontology. 
Moreover, the ground of philosophy is the question of being and nothing besides 
being.17  
 
Heidegger appropriates this ground of the proper of philosophy from Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics – the question of being qua being. In his lectures of 1924 to 1925 entitled 
Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger posits the proper of philosophy via a doubled reading of 
Aristotle – a reflection on the being of beings (that reveals) the (authentic) Sophist in 
their being.18 In other words, the proper ground of philosophy is found by recovering 
the origin of thinking about being, insofar as being is the proper matter of thought, 
and insofar as this recovery discloses the authentic way of being-human that 
motivates and grounds philosophy as a way of existence. Aristotle, as such, is the 
point of origin for this recovery of authentic being.19 
 
Equally, Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle as the point of origin for grounding 
philosophy-proper also reveals the ‘hyper-Aristotelian’ dimension of Heidegger’s 
seinsfrage. In the first instance, it is precisely Aristotle’s question of being qua being 
that is preconceived as the proper matter of thought. Further, it is Aristotle’s 
interpretation of his predecessors within the question of being that serves as the basis 
for Heidegger’s recovery of the authentic way of being of philosophy. Finally, it is 
Aristotle’s question of being that serves as the ground of Heidegger’s destruction of 
the tradition of metaphysics and the quest to recover a pre-metaphysical question of 
being. 
 
B. The Destruction of Metaphysics as onto-theology: 
The quest for ground, or the question of being as ground, leads to Heidegger’s 
destruction of metaphysics as onto-theology. To oversimplify; Heidegger seeks to 
overcome metaphysics by showing that metaphysics is onto-theology: a kind of 
philosophy that is founded on an abstraction of everyday concern for being. 
Heidegger argues that metaphysics is founded upon the everyday inauthentic concern 
of Greek-Dasein: a concern for the relation of f u s i j and the divine – the divine as the 
objectified ground of physis.20  
 
There are at least three primary dimensions to this destruction of metaphysics as onto-
theology. The first is what Heidegger describes as the corruption of the idea of physis; 
the gradual change in the Greek concept from the original sense of the ‘emergence of 
being’ to a static ‘always-presence’ or causality.21  This corruption of philosophy is, 
in Heidegger’s view, exemplified in the way in which Aristotle’s Physics serves as the 
foundational motive of the Metaphysics and the formulation of ground and being as 
first cause. The second dimension is what Heidegger characterises as the subsumption 
of being under the idea(l).22 Here, the static characterisation of being as always-
presence forms the basis of constituting being as an idea – a transcendent ideal that 
stands over and above beings in their being. Finally, then, this subsumption of being 
under the idea(l) then allows what gets called metaphysical ground as first cause – the 
divine, the ought, as the supreme idea(l) that lies beyond being: “being never is yet, 
but always ought to be”.23 
 
C. The Rejection of Ethics as grounded on onto-theology 
So, it is no surprise that Heidegger rejects Ethics as a philosophical endeavour. First, 
Ethics is constituted as metaphysical grounding on an everyday understanding of 
being as: the ought, the ideal, and always-presence. Moreover, Heidegger critiques the 
Nicomachean Ethics as the ground of the metaphysical distinction between being and 
the ought of being; for Aristotle’s conceptualisation of s of i a  poses a distantiation 
between being-human and being-Divine insofar as the foundation of the ‘good’ is not 
being-human but rather the divine (1177b26-35). Ethics is also a kind of metaphysical 
thinking grounded on a ‘factical experience’ in which authenticity, the good life, is 
experienced as otherwise than being-human - ‘the ought’ – which Heidegger views as 
the tyranny of value over philosophy.24 Therefore, Heidegger’s rejection of Ethics 
ultimately reflects a rejection of the kind of ‘factical’ life that generates this 
metaphysical distinction between being and ‘the ought of being’.  
 
4. The Ontical Reduction of Religion and the Problem of Ethoj: 
It is no secret that Aristotle posits the foundation of Ethics upon the beliefs or 
opinions of what could be called ‘Greek Religion’. Additionally, it is no secret that 
the tradition of metaphysics has been dominated by ‘Christianity’ – a religious 
tradition. So, it should come as no surprise that Heidegger’s rejection of ethics is also 
founded upon a deconstruction of the phenomenon of Religion.  
 
Herein, there are three primary arguments given in the interpretation of Religion that 
are relevant to the rejection of ethics. In the lectures of 1920-1921 entitled 
‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’ Heidegger argues that Religion 
signifies factical life; an expression of everyday concern for God as a present object.25 
Further, the phenomenon of religion shows itself as a kind of understanding of being-
human that is founded upon the idea of God as other, or knowing about the inner 
human founded on an experience of God.26 As such, the religious notion of 
authenticity, of truth, and of knowing is grounded on the idea of God - the 
objectification of an experience of the truth of being. Thus, in his lectures on St. 
Augustine Heidegger argues that Religion is factical living that seeks the truth of 
being27, and yet misunderstands being by constituting being as a supernatural, ideal 
entity.  
 
The underlying assertions of Heidegger’s interpretation of religion form three 
arguments against Ethics. First, Religion is interpreted as the kind of factical living 
that motivates ethics insofar as religious experience constitutes being as an ideal 
entity that is absolutely other to being-human. Thus, Religion motivates the question 
of the good on the basis of an experience of not-being-good, of not-being-the-ideal 
entity. Moreover, Religion is the ground of ethics insofar as religious experience 
constitutes knowing as an understanding of that which is not-human, and yet, is what 
humans ‘ought to be’. Finally, religious experience has a tendency to constitute the 
idea of God as supernatural – an always-present entity. In other words, the implicit 
argument of Heidegger’s interpretation is that Religion, or something like religion, 
founds both metaphysics and ethics – it is essentially the grounding of thinking and 
living on something otherwise than being-human. For Heidegger, insofar as the truth 
of being is the identity of truth and being, the factical life of religious experience is 
the absolute enemy of authenticity and thus the enemy of thinking the truth of being.28  
5. The Way that Indicates a r c h – The retrieval of early Greek thinking:  
So… we have arrived at the point at which Heidegger has justified the rejection of 
Ethics as ultimately grounded on the idea of ‘the ought’ – an idea founded upon a 
religious experience of authenticity as something otherwise than being-human. The 
potential ground for a formulation of Ethos as being-truly-human has also been 
established in the identity of being and truth… and yet Heidegger needs to complete 
this movement via a recovery of the origin of philosophy in order to show just how 
this truly-being-oneself is a possibility of human existence.  
 
There are three primary dimensions to what Heidegger finds in the retrieval of Pre-
metaphysical thought in relation to the question of ethos. First, Heidegger finds that 
a l ethei a , the truth of being shows itself in Pre-metaphysical thought in two ways: 
through the l og oj and m u thoj of Plato’s Politeia.29 The truth of being, therein, is 
disclosed as  the d a i m on ej – the uncanny – the unhomely.30   In other words, the truth 
of being emerges for Dasein as the uncanny within the ordinary… and therein… calls 
Dasein into becoming at home with the truth of being; of being truly oneself as the 
uncanny. The experience of the truth of being in an authentic pre-metaphysical sense, 
has two possibilities: logos or thinking, and mythos or the poetic. The former, as 
ontology proper, is neither experienced or the ground of living, for ontology only 
discloses the truth of being and how it emerges for Dasein. The latter, as m u thoj, is 
the poetic expression of the truth of being that is an authentic experience… an 
authentic facticity. 
 
6. Ethos – A Lived dwelling with-in the truth of being disclosed by the poet: 
I would like, in conclusion, to attempt a brief overview of how Heidegger arrives at 
an aesthetic notion of ethos. Heidegger’s path begins with the prioritisation of the 
question of being wherein there are three foundational preconceptions about ethos: 
First, ethos signifies being-human. Further, the primary sense of being is truth. 
Moreover, being signifies ground. Thus, ethos signifies being-truly-human in our 
ground.   This formulation is the basis of Heidegger’s rejection of Ethics insofar as 
ethics is traditionally founded upon a distinction between being-human and who 
humans ought to be. This ought is constituted as the id-entity of ground as creator or 
first cause. Having rejected ethics, metaphysics and religion as intertwined modes of 
inauthenticity, Heidegger then needs to find an alternative ‘authentic’ mode of 
facticity which does not distinguish between being-human and the truth of being.  
 
This question of ethos, of an authentic factical life, is thus a problem of disclosing 
what it is to be truly-human in our ground. This disclosure is only possible through 
the ways in which being shows itself as the ground of being-human: history, thinking 
and language. With regard to history, the truth of being is disclosed as originary 
ground – a pre-metaphysical way of being which also forms an eschatological horizon 
of the historical return of a way of being-truly-human. But this historical horizon is 
not-yet an authentic factical life. With regard to thinking, the truth of being is 
disclosed as ethos – of being-truly-human in our ground that is understood, but not-
factically lived. Thinking is not an authentic factical life, for thinking is for the sake 
of ethos. As such, both history and thinking do not fully express the possibility of an 
authentic ethos.  In language, however, the truth of being emerges as an authentic 
factical life – a being-truly-human that is experienced through and founded upon 
poetry. In other words, the aesthetic is the truth of being-human and thus also the 
ground of being-human.31 The poet, is as such, that which gets called the demigod – 
the human who indicates the ground and truth of being-human.32 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the lectures on Holderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ 
contain four primary expressions of an authentic factical life. The first is the historical 
affinity of pre-metaphysical Greek facticity and the destiny of the German people.33 
The second is the link between Greek and German thinking: the relation constituted 
by Heidegger’s own quest for the truth of being that fulfils the pre-metaphysical way 
of thinking. The third, then, is the affinity of Greek and German poets – whose poetry 
is the divine revelation of the truth of being.34  Finally, there is the affinity of the 
goddess A l ethei a  and the goddess Germania – for the truth of being is essentially an 
aesthetic mythical experience of being-truly-human in one’s own home-land; the 
originary homeland of A l ethei a  and the destined home-land of mother Germania.35 
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Angus Brook
Abstract: ‘Martin Heidegger’s Path to an Aesthetic Ethoj’
Martin Heidegger is infamous for his rejection of the validity of Ethics as a
philosophical endeavour (‘Letter on Humanism’) and moreover, for his aesthetic
formulation of ethoj (Holderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”). In this paper I would like to
trace the path of Heidegger’s thought from his engagement with Aristotle’s
metaphysics, through a recovery of pre-Socratic thought, to the formulation of ethoj
as an authentic dwelling in which the poet becomes the demigod; the divine
messenger of the truth of being.
I will argue, along the way, that Heidegger’s formulation of an aesthetic ethoj hinges
on the question of grounding; of grounding philosophy and dwelling on the proper
(the truth of being). Further, the question of ground also implicitly involves the
process of rejecting alternative potential ways of grounding – in this case – the
rejection of onto-theology: science and religion. In tracing Martin Heidegger’s path to
an aesthetic formulation of ethoj I will also attempt to draw out two of the basic
presuppositions of Heidegger’s thought, namely: the ‘hyper-Aristotelian’ foundation
of the seinsfrage and the strange belief that the German language and dwelling is
somehow the spiritual descendent of early Greek authenticity.
